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Abstract— The emerging technology enabling autonomy in
vehicles has led to a variety of new problems in transportation
networks, such as planning and perception for autonomous
vehicles. Other works consider social objectives such as decreas-
ing fuel consumption and travel time by platooning. However,
these strategies are limited by the actions of the surrounding
human drivers. In this paper, we consider proactively achieving
these social objectives by influencing human behavior through
planned interactions. Our key insight is that we can use these
social objectives to design local interactions that influence human
behavior to achieve these goals. To this end, we characterize the
increase in road capacity afforded by platooning, as well as the
vehicle configuration that maximizes road capacity. We present
a novel algorithm that uses a low-level control framework to
leverage local interactions to optimally rearrange vehicles. We
showcase our algorithm using a simulated road shared between
autonomous and human-driven vehicles, in which we illustrate
the reordering in action.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the field of autonomous driving has
experienced significant advances in the design of planning
and perception algorithms [1]–[8]. However, such techniques
mainly consider a single autonomous vehicle without actually
studying its societal effects such as its impact on commuter
delay. On the other hand, recent work in transportation study
how autonomous vehicles can achieve broader objectives such
as increasing fuel efficiency and decreasing latency through
techniques such as platooning [9]–[14]. The mobility benefits
of platooning autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicles have
been largely studied in the literature for both freeway networks
[15]–[19] and urban networks [11], [20]. Another line of
work has focused on designing efficient scheduling policies
at intersections by leveraging the autonomy of vehicles and
their communication capabilities [21]–[26]. While previous
techniques are quite valuable at solely studying local or
global level properties, the two paradigms can actively
influence each other. This emphasizes the urgency and
importance of understanding the interactions between humans
and autonomous vehicles on shared roads as well as the
global effects of these interactions. For example, autonomous
vehicles can stabilize traffic flow by damping shock waves in
congested roads [27]–[30]. However, previous techniques do
not proactively create the circumstances that would enable
them to positively impact these societal objectives: cars do
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Fig. 1: Road shared by autonomous (orange) and human-driven (white) cars.
not go out of their way to platoon, and they do not find
congested traffic to stabilize.
Our key insight is that we need to actively influence
human behavior by designing local interactions
informed by desirable societal objectives for the
shared road.
For instance, by anticipating a human’s impatient response,
an autonomous vehicle can influence a human driver to switch
lanes by slowing down in front of them [31]. Leveraging this
insight, we plan to develop algorithms for interaction-aware
and socially-aware autonomous vehicles that actively design
their environments to reflect the most socially advantageous
configurations. Specifically, in this work, we design algo-
rithms for autonomous cars to maximizes the road capacity.
They achieve this via a sequence of interactions with human
drivers to reorder the vehicles on the road in order to platoon
as much as possible. For instance, as shown in Fig. 1, if
all autonomous cars (orange cars) on a road take interactive
local actions that enforce human-driven cars (white cars) to
open up some space, the autonomous cars can then leverage
the opportunity to form a platoon (Fig. 1 (b)).
In this work, we build on notions of road capacity on shared
roads [12] to include the idea of optimal lane allocation and
vehicle ordering within a lane. We then provide theoretical
results on the structure and qualities of the optimal solution.
We demonstrate that the optimal allocation and ordering can
practically be achieved using state-of-the-art interaction-aware
controllers [2]. Our contributions in this paper are summarized
as follows:
• Leveraging local interactions between autonomous and
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human-driven cars to modify the road configuration in
open loop to an optimal configuration.
• Precisely characterizing the optimal vehicle reordering
and the price of no control, which quantifies the benefits
of our algorithm.
• Implementing the controller for a mixed autonomy
setting via simulation showing tight agreement with
our theoretical results.
We defer proofs of all theoretical results to the appendix.
II. RUNNING EXAMPLE
In this section, we introduce a running example that
describes an instance of the problem of our interest. Imagine
a road shown in Fig. 1 shared by autonomous and human-
driven cars. The orange cars represent autonomous cars, and
the white cars represent human-driven cars.
The vehicles, autonomous or human-driven, probabilisti-
cally arrive at any of the three lanes 1, 2, 3 (where lane
1 is the leftmost lane). As we will discuss throughout the
paper, the vehicles keep a headway between each other, and
this headway is much smaller if two autonomous cars are
following each other, i.e., h¯ < h. This reduced headway is
described by the term platooning, which intuitively means
that autonomous cars, unlike human-driven cars, are capable
of coordinating with each other and driving close to each
other to save space and energy.
Our goal in this work is to start with a road configuration
as shown in Fig. 1 (a) and plan for the autonomous cars
to navigate intelligently for the goal of converging to a
configuration similar to that of Fig. 1 (b).
We theoretically construct the most efficient road configura-
tion based on an optimal vehicle lane assignment and ordering
problem and study its properties. In addition, to achieve
this optimal configuration, we leverage local interaction-
aware controllers for autonomous cars. As shown in previous
work [2], the autonomous vehicle can indirectly affect a
human-driven car to take desirable actions that result in the
ideal road configuration. In constructing these configurations,
we assume that the heavy, local optimizations are solved
in a distributed fashion (separately by each vehicle), and
that a central controller exists which functions only to send
and receive simple messages to coordinate actions among
vehicles.
III. FORMALISM
Our goal in this paper is to leverage the low level
interactions between autonomous and human-driven cars to
arrange the vehicles in a fashion that is desirable from the
road network’s perspective. To achieve this goal, we plan to
answer two questions:
1) Assuming autonomous and human-driven vehicles can
reorder themselves from any configuration to another
(for example from Fig. 1 (a) to Fig. 1 (b)), what is the
optimal configuration for the network?
2) How can we leverage the capability of autonomous cars
to enforce this configuration?
To study this problem, we first discuss road capacity as
a desirable property for the road network. Road capacity
has been used as a common measure to be optimized for a
desirable traffic network [20], [32]. We model road capacity
in mixed autonomy as in our previous works [12], [13]
To model road capacity, we consider how many vehicles
can be packed onto a road, with all vehicles traveling at
nominal velocity and respecting their reaction time constraints.
To this end, each car has a certain headway in front of it
depending on the type of the car, as well as the type of the
car it follows. In this model motivated by previous work
in capacity modeling [12], [20], [32], [33], we assume that
human-driven cars follow all vehicles at a distance of h and
autonomous cars follow other autonomous cars by a distance
of h¯ (typically h¯ < h) and follow human-driven cars with
a distance of h (as shown in Fig. 1 (a)). Note that these
quantities will vary by road as they depend on the nominal
speed on that road. Further, the capacity on a road depends on
the ordering of the vehicles on the road; we assume vehicle
types are determined as the result of a Bernoulli process.
We consider the capacity on a multi-lane road to be the
sum of capacities of each lane. To find lane capacity, we
first find the average headway, which is a function of the
level of autonomy of the lane, defined as αi =
yi
xi+yi
∈ [0, 1],
where xi and yi are respectively the volume of human-driven
and autonomous vehicles in lane i. For instance, the level of
autonomy for the leftmost lane in Fig. 1 (a) is α1 = 24 .
Let hj be the headway in front of vehicle j, and let HN be
the total expected headway for N vehicles on road i. Then,
using linearity of expectation and the Bernoulli assumption,
HN = ∑N−1j=1 E[hj] = (N − 1)(α2i h¯+ (1− α2i )h).
If each vehicle has length L, then as the number of vehicles
N increases, the average space taken by a vehicle approaches
α2i h¯+ (1− α2i )h+ L. The capacity is the number of vehicles
that can be fit on a lane of length d, so
c(αi) =
d
α2i h¯+ (1− α2i )h+ L
=
d
k1 − α2i k2
, (1)
where we define two constants k1 , L+ h and k2 , h− h¯,
and k1 > k2. Note that throughout the paper we consider
same parameters, d, h, h¯, L, for all the lanes.
Upper Bound on Capacity. If we do not assume that the
vehicles will arrive from some Bernoulli process and instead
allow some arbitrary process to determine the ordering of the
vehicles, the capacity model described above will no longer
be accurate. Though the specific form of the capacity function
will depend on the ordering, we define a capacity model that
serves as an upper bound on the capacity for any ordering.
This upper bound corresponds to the situation in which all
autonomous cars are ordered optimally, meaning they are all
adjacent and can form one long platoon.
In this case, each autonomous car has a short headway
h¯ and each human-driven vehicle has headway h, yielding
the average headway αi h¯ + (1− αi)h. This results in the
following capacity function:
cUB(αi) =
d
αi h¯+ (1− αi)h¯+ L
=
d
k1 − αik2 . (2)
Since for all i lanes αi ∈ [0, 1], it is clear that cUB(αi) ≥
c(αi). Further, cUB serves as a tight upper bound with regards
to vehicle ordering with a large number of vehicles.
A. Characterizing Optimal Lane Assignment and Ordering
We now pose optimization problems for vehicle lane choice
when operating at capacity, under the capacity models in (1)
and (2). We also provide theoretical results pertaining to the
optimal lane assignment and attendant total road capacities.
Optimal Lane Assignment and Ordering. Assuming
that the autonomy level for each lane αi is chosen by a
system operator, we now describe the high-level optimal lane
assignment problem that maximizes the total capacity of the
road.
Here we consider a multi-lane road to have a total capacity
that is the sum of the capacity of each lane. All lane
parameters will be the same, and the only difference between
capacities in the lanes is due to different lane levels of
autonomy αi.
Let α¯ denote the overall autonomy level on the road, i.e.
the fraction all cars that are autonomous. Further, let α =[
α1, . . . , αn
]T . Then, we define
C(α) ,
n
∑
i=1
c(αi) , (3)
G(α) ,
n
∑
i=1
(αi − α¯)c(αi) . (4)
The social planner’s optimization problem is as follows:
α∗ = arg max
α
C(α) (5)
s.t. G(α) = 0 , (6)
where αi ∈ [0, 1] for all lanes and (6) constrains the solution
to have overall autonomy level equal to α¯, the autonomy
level of the traffic feeding the road. To see this, observe that
∑ni=1 αic(αi) is the sum of autonomous cars on all lanes and
has to be equal to α¯∑ni=1 c(αi), which implies (6). Moreover,
note that all the lanes have the same length, i.e. di = d; thus,
we implicitly assume that lane utilization is at capacity.
Theorem 1: Consider an optimization problem of the form
(5). Any solution will have at most one lane with mixed
autonomy, i.e. at most one lane with αi ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 1: This theorem formalizes the intuition that
mixing autonomous and regular cars only decreases capacity,
as it lessens the likelihood of adjacent autonomous vehicles,
the condition necessary for platooning.
Now that we have information that narrows down the set
of possible solutions, we can derive a closed-form expression
for optimal lane assignment, as expressed in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: Let α∗ =
[
α∗1 , . . . , α
∗
n
]T be an optimum of
(5), with autonomy levels ordered in decreasing order. Let m
denote the last lane with full autonomy, i.e. m = max i s.t.
α∗i = 1, where m = 0 implies that there are no lanes with
full autonomy. Then,
m = b α¯n(k1 − k2)
k1 − α¯k2 c.
Remark 2: One can also derive a closed-form expression
for α∗m+1 by solving a quadratic equation, but for the sake
of brevity we omit this result.
After characterizing the optimal solution to (5), we now
describe the lane assignment that minimizes total capacity.
This will be used to characterize the cost of declining to
optimally route vehicles, which is developed in Section III-C.
Proposition 1: Let α∗ denote the worst-case lane assign-
ment, corresponding to the minimum sum of capacities:
α∗ = argmin
α
C(α) s.t. (6).
Then, α∗ = 1Tn α¯ and C(α∗) = nc(α¯), where 1n is the row
vector of ones of length n.
See Appendix VI-C for a sketch of the proof. Intuitively, the
worst-case lane assignment is when all lanes have autonomy
level equal to the overall autonomy level. This means that
any perturbation from uniform autonomy level allows benefits
from platooning.
Upper Bound on Capacity Under Optimal Ordering.
Using the upper bound capacity in (2), we now formulate
an optimization problem to find the theoretical maximum
capacity on a road with n lanes, with autonomy level α¯.
For reasons of readability, we use β when discussing
autonomy levels that are solutions to the upper bound capacity
maximization. As before, let CUB(β) , ∑ni=1 cUB(βi) and
GUB(β) , ∑ni=1(βi − α¯)cUB(βi). The optimization problem
is then:
max
β
CUB(β) (7)
s.t. GUB(β) = 0 , (8)
βi ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i
We next present a lemma showing that the total capacity
when using the upper bound on capacity is invariant to lane
assignment.
Proposition 2: Any feasible solution to (7) has cost
ncUB(α¯).
This proposition follows from the ordering-invariant nature
of the capacity upper bound. One can also construct a proof
similar to that of Proposition 1.
Remark 3: Given that all feasible lane assignments have
the same total capacity, there are two notable lane assign-
ments to consider. One is the uniform assignment, β∗ =[
α¯, . . . , α¯
]T . Another is is the assignment with a maximum
of one mixed lane, such as the one developed in Theorem 2 for
the original capacity function. In this case, there will be same
number of purely autonomous lanes, which is apparent from
the proof of the theorem. However, the level of autonomy
in the mixed lane will differ from that in the solution to (5).
Again, for brevity we do not state the closed-form solution
for this autonomy level, but it can be found by manipulating
the constraint (8).
B. Local Interaction on Shared Roads
Now that we have discussed optimal vehicle arrangement,
we address the second question of our interest, i.e., how can
we leverage the capability of autonomous cars to enact this
optimal arrangement?
The solution of the optimal lane assignment problem
provides an optimal level of autonomy α∗ based on the
model of road capacity as we have discussed so far. Since
the cars are driving on shared roads, we leverage the power
of autonomous cars to enforce this level of autonomy by
allowing them to navigate intelligently on the road.
The autonomous cars in each lane can take actions that
affect the behavior of the human-driven cars. For instance,
they can cause humans to change lanes, slow down, or speed
up. These local actions can in fact create a reordering of the
vehicles. Our goal is to intelligently create such reorderings
in order to get closer to the optimal capacity for the road. In
this section, we discuss how to initiate this local reordering.
We model the local interactions between one autonomous
car and one human-driven car as a dynamical system:
xt+1 = f (xt, utA, u
t
H), where the states of the world x
t
evolve based on the actions of the human-driven car utH and
the autonomous car utA. Our goal in these local interactions
is to design a controller for the autonomous car, i.e., u∗A(u
∗
H),
that not only achieves reaching its destination but also can
affect the actions of the human-driven car. In other words, it
can target specific reactions from the human-driven car. We
follow the work of Sadigh et al. [2] to design such controllers
by formulating the problem as a nested optimization:
u∗A = arg maxuA
RA(x, uA, u∗H(x, uA)) . (9)
Here RA denotes the autonomous car’s reward function which,
if optimized, outputs a sequence of actions for the autonomous
car u∗A. We assume this reward function is a combination
of objectives such as avoiding collisions, keeping distance
to the road boundaries, and the vehicle reaching its goal.
Specific goals, such as influencing humans to switch lanes,
also appear in RA.
The optimization in 9 depends on a model of the human
driving behavior that outputs u∗H . In this work, we model
humans as agents who optimize their own reward function:
u∗H = arg maxuH
RH(x, u∗A, uH) . (10)
Similarly, this reward function encodes the goals and objec-
tives of the human-driven car such as collision avoidance
or keeping a certain velocity and heading. The specific
formulation of both RH and RA can be found in [3].
The reward RH is usually learned from demonstration via
techniques such as inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) [34]–
[36], in which trajectories of human driving are collected
in an offline setting and RH is then computed based on the
collected trajectories.
We note that optimizing the autonomous car’s reward
function RA (as in (9)) can implicitly manipulate the actions
of the human-driven car. Similarly, the actions of the human-
driven car can influence the autonomous vehicle’s actions.
To avoid infinite regress from this endless recursion, we
approximate this interaction using a Stackelberg (leader-
follower) game [37], where we assume the autonomous car
plays first influencing the human driver, while the human
driver observes actions taken by the autonomous vehicle.
In practice, this approximation accurately reflects observed
behavior since the autonomous vehicles replans repeatedly
using a model predictive controller [2].
Though in theory this controller can be extended to
autonomous vehicles influencing multiple humans in the pres-
ence of other autonomous vehicles, the nested optimization in
(9) is very computationally intensive. We therefore limit our
scheme to have each autonomous vehicle take into account its
influence over a single human driver, while treating the actions
of other drivers, as well as the actions of other autonomous
vehicles, as fixed with respect to the autonomous vehicle’s
actions.
Through this interaction between an autonomous car and
a human-driven car (9), we can intelligently design reward
functions for the autonomous car RA, which then leads to
actions from the autonomous car u∗A that help the vehicle
navigate for more efficient road usage by affecting the actions
of the human-driven car u∗H . We refer to the human influenced
as being paired with the autonomous vehicle.
C. Cost of lack of planning
We have now discussed how one can solve the optimal lane
assignment problem, as well as how local interactions affect
the actions of the human-driven car. Before presenting our
simulation results, we first present theoretical limits on how
much performance can be improved by optimally assigning
lanes and optimally reordering in the mixed lane. This will
allow us to gauge the efficacy of our control scheme, as well as
judge when it is worthwhile to attempt more difficult vehicle
manipulation. We do this by examining the magnitude of
potential gains that can be achieved by these more complicated
maneuvers. To this end, we introduce the following two
quantities:
Definition 1: The price of negligence, denoted Λ, is the
maximum ratio between road capacity at optimal vehicle
arrangement on a road to capacity at the worst-case lane
assignment. This is formalized as follows:
Λ = max
α¯,n,L,h,h¯
CUB(β∗)
C(α∗)
s.t. feasible network parameters.
Remark 4: Note that worst-case lane assignment in the
denominator above maintains the Bernoulli assumption, i.e.
not considering worst-case car ordering. Under worst-case
ordering, autonomous and human-driven cars would be
interleaved, unlike the assumption leading to the capacity
model in (1).
Definition 2: The price of no control, denoted Γ, is the
maximum ratio between road capacity at optimal vehicle
ordering on a road and road capacity at best-case vehicle
lane assignment without reordering. This is formalized as
Γ = max
α¯,n,L,h,h¯
CUB(β∗)
C(α∗)
s.t. feasible network parameters.
With this in mind, we present our bounds on these quantities.
Theorem 3: The price of negligence is bounded by
Λ ≤ 2
L+ h−
√
(L+ h)(L+ h¯)
h− h¯ ≤ 2 ,
and the price of no control is bounded by
Γ ≤ 2n(L+ h)
(2n− 1)(L+ h) +
√
(L+ h)(L+ h¯)
≤ 2n
2n− 1 .
Remark 5: The derived upper bounds on Λ and Γ are
achieved by setting vehicle length L and short headway h¯
to 0. Intuitively, the gain due to platooning increases as the
space taken up by a platoon decreases.
Remark 6: Note that Γ ≤ Λ, with equality when n = 1.
This is because when there is only one lane, there is no gain
from optimal lane assignment.
The implications of the upper bounds on price of negligence
and price of no control are perhaps surprising. This means that
if vehicle type is decided by a Bernoulli process, optimally
ordering the vehicles will result in at most a factor of 2
increase in capacity. In a more realistic scenario, consider
L = 4, h = 30, h¯ = 11. Then, Λ ≤ 1.202, meaning that the
maximum possible improvement is approximately 20%.
Note that a 20% increase in capacity may yield far more
than a 20% improvement in road latency. For example, a
fourth-order polynomial is commonly used in traffic literature
to describe the relationship between vehicle flow on a road
and the road’s latency. Consider, as in [38, Ch. 13], road
latency of the form `(x) = t0[1 + ρ( xc′ )
σ], where x is the
volume of traffic on the road, c′ is the “practical capacity”,
t0 is the free-flow travel time, and ρ and σ are typically 0.15
and 4, respectively. Using this model, under a given traffic
flow, a 20% increase in capacity leads to a 50% reduction in
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latency due to congestion. In high congestion, this results in
a large decrease in total latency.
IV. ACHIEVING OPTIMAL CONFIGURATION
In this section we describe our algorithm for approaching
the capacity increases yielded from the optimal lane assign-
ment and optimal vehicle ordering. We describe our algorithm
and discuss the theoretical upper bound for performance at
each stage. Below is a summary of the policy:
• Phase 0: Cars are i itialized in an intermixed config-
urat on and ord ing in all lanes is determined by a
Bernoulli process with parameter α¯.
• Phase 1: Autonomous vehicles follow optimal lane
assignment.
• Phase 2: Autonomous vehicles influence human drivers
in local interactions to follow optimal lane assignment.
• Phase 3: Autonomous vehicles start platooning in the
mixed lane, if one exists.
Note that if we were to terminate the policy at phase 2,
we would want the lane assignment to follow the solution
to (5). However, if we terminate the policy at phase 3, the
optimal lane assignment is the solution to (7). The number of
purely autonomous lanes in the solutions are the same (see
Remark 3), but the autonomy level in the mixed lanes will
differ. We choose the optimistic assignment, which assumes
that we can optimally rearrange the vehicles.
A. Phase 1: Autonomous cars follow lane assignment
In this stage, pictured in Fig. 2 (Phase 1), autonomous
vehicles switch lanes to satisfy their optimal lane assignment
determined by α∗, the ordered solution to (7). The human-
driven vehicles are not assumed to follow the optimal lane
assignment by the end of this stage.
To accomplish this, each autonomous vehicle can be
directed to switch to a specific lane, if there is a strong
centralized control with close sensing and communication
with the vehicles. This can be accomplished in a decentralized
manner as well, if the autonomous vehicles are given a
vector of probabilities q∗ = [q∗1 q
∗
2 ... q
∗
n]
T corresponding
to α∗, where q∗i is the probability that an autonomous
vehicle is assigned to lane i. The vehicles then sample from
a generalized Bernoulli distribution with parameter q∗ to
determine which lane to inhabit.
However the desired lane is selected, in the process of
switching lanes, each autonomous vehicle will determine its
action by performing the nested optimization in (9) while
including behavior of the human-driven vehicles in their path.
This pairing allows the autonomous car to model the human’s
responses, allowing it to merge even when there is not a large
space for it, by relying on trailing human-driven vehicles
slowing down in response to the autonomous car.
B. Phase 2: Autonomous cars influence human lane choice
This phase takes place only if the solution to (5) yields
at least one lane with all autonomous vehicles, i.e. α1 = 1.
Otherwise, all influence over human-driven cars occurs in the
mixed lane, which takes place during Phase 3.
If there are some lanes that under lane assignment have only
autonomous vehicles, in this stage the autonomous vehicles
in those lanes influence the human-driven vehicles to enforce
this solution, as shown in Fig. 2 (Phase 2). Lane-by-lane,
starting with lane 1, autonomous cars influence human drivers
to leave their lanes. This is done by having each autonomous
car check if there is a human-driven vehicle behind it; if so, it
pairs with that vehicle and with the goal to influence them to
merge rightward. In a decentralized manner, each autonomous
vehicle in an autonomous lane monitors its surroundings, and
if there are no human-driven vehicles to the left of it, it
checks for a human-driven vehicle behind it. If there is one,
it influences it to move to the lane on the right.
By the end of this phase, lanes designated as purely
autonomous will be so, with all autonomous vehicles in these
lane forming long platoons. We expect the total capacity at
the end of this phase to compare to the solution of (5).
C. Phase 3: Autonomous cars platoon in the mixed lane
Though the theoretical maximum capacity under the
Bernoulli assumption has been achieved at this point, if
there is a lane with mixed autonomy, the capacity can be
further improved by platooning the vehicles in that lane. If
the mixed lane is the only lane with autonomous vehicles,
i.e., ∀i, α∗i < 1, then autonomous vehicles can pair with
human-driven cars behind them, leading them out of the lane,
until they reach another autonomous car and platoon with it.
However, if there is a lane with full autonomy, this scheme
can be more easily achieved through a series of swaps, as
seen in Fig. 2 (Phase 3). If there is a lone autonomous vehicle,
it can merge into the adjacent full-autonomy lane, and another
car can exit the lane to join a platoon in the mixed lane. The
exiting vehicle can do this by pairing with the human-driven
vehicle behind the vehicle it wants to platoon with, so that it
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will not be too cautious in switching lanes. Alternatively, the
vehicle to be platooned with can slow down, and the merging
vehicle will move in front of it.
By the end of this phase, total capacity will be lower
bounded by the optimal capacity in (5), and upper bounded
by the optimum of (7).
In this section, we discuss our autonomous driving simula-
tion framework and compare the results of the simulation to
the theoretical bounds established in Section III-A.
D. Experimental Setup
We simulate a two-lane road with 20 vehicles, at varying
levels of autonomy. To determine vehicle arrangement at the
start of the simulation, we create a population with desired
number of vehicles of each type, shuffle it, then randomly
place the vehicles into lanes, ensuring that each lane has the
same number of vehicles. This begins phase 0, in which
cars are intermixed as the result of a Bernoulli process.
Human-driven cars are simulated as agents optimizing a
reward function, specifically the rewards in [2].
E. Driving Simulator
We use a simple point-mass model for the dynamics of each
vehicle, where the state of the system is: x = [x y θ v]>.
x, y represent the coordinates of the vehicle on the road, θ
is its heading, and v is its velocity. We assume two control
inputs u = [u1 u2] each representing the steering angle
and the acceleration of the vehicle. We then represent the
dynamics of each vehicle as the following, where γ is the
friction coefficient:
[x˙ y˙ θ˙ v˙] = [v · cos(θ) v · sin(θ) v · u1 u2 − γ · v].
F. Simulation Results
Recall the situation of Fig. 1 and note that our goal
is to start in a configuration similar to the left side and
end in a situation such as the right. Noting our theoretical
upper and lower bounds on the effects of lane choice and
ordering, we show in Fig. 3 the results of the mid-level
optimization and compare it to the earlier derived upper
and lower bounds. Constrained the computationally intensive
nested optimization (9), we simulate 200 time steps using a
setup with 20 cars at varying autonomy levels. As expected,
each run lies between the two curves. We note that the few
data points which exceed the upper bound are because the
upper bound includes the headway of the frontmost vehicles
– this is a good approximation for a large number of vehicles,
but the simulation includes only 20. Note also that at lower
levels of autonomy, the data points are closer to the upper
bound, whereas at higher levels, the data points are closer
to the lower bound. This is due to the fact that the nested
optimization is done one car at a time and with only one
other car in the network. We illustrate the timing of the local
interactions in Fig. 4, noting that when the velocity of the
autonomous cars drops dramatically, it indicates a movement
intended to influence a human-driven car.
G. Implementation Details
In our implementation of the nested optimization, we
used the software package Theano [39], [40] to symbolically
compute all Jacobians and Hessians. Theano optimizes the
computation graph into efficient C code, which is crucial for
real-time applications. In our implementation, each step of
our optimization is solved with a horizon length N = 5. We
run the large-scale simulations with 20 cars in the network on
a cluster using 4 CPU’s with a maximum utilization of 36 GB
RAM between them. We make the code publicly available
here: https://github.com/Stanford-HRI/MultilaneInteractions.
V. DISCUSSION
Summary. We introduce a procedure to connect societal
goals for shared roads to low-level interactions designed for
autonomous vehicles to influence human drivers. To this end,
we provide theoretical guarantees on the potential of optimally
assigning lanes and re-ordering to maximize road capacity
via platooning. Finally, we implement an algorithm to achieve
this reordering.
Limitations. The nested optimization is extremely compu-
tationally heavy, and is natural to be run in a distributed
setting in which each car runs its own nested optimization.
It would be interesting to implement a fully distributed
version of the algorithm and compare the results to the
current implementation. Additionally, we emphasize that the
simulations were not run with real humans, but rather with
agents whose reward functions were learned from humans.
Each human is, however, different and this could have large
impacts on the performance of the algorithm. We plan to
address these shortcomings in future work.
Conclusion. We demonstrate the connection between societal
objectives and vehicle-level control in transportation networks
and design a unifying scheme utilizing both to achieve optimal
efficiency in the network.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that there exists
a solution α∗ to (5) with components α∗i , α
∗
j ∈ (0, 1), where
i 6= j. Assume without loss of generality that αi ≤ αj. If αi =
αj, we can construct a new solution with same total capacity
in which αi 6= αj. This is because ∂∂αiC(α) =
∂
∂αj
C(α) and
∂
∂αi
G(α) = ∂∂αjG(α), so the autonomy level on road i can
be decreased by some infinitesimal value e and autonomy
level on road j increased by e, thereby maintaining the same
capacity sum and satisfying the constraint.
Now that we have established an optimal solution with
α∗i < α
∗
j with α
∗
i , α
∗
j ∈ (0, 1), we explore a further
perturbation of our solution. We construct a new routing
αˆ with αˆi = α∗i − e1 and αˆj = α∗j + e2, where e1, e2 > 0
with these unequal infinitesimal perturbations designed such
that the constraint remains satisfied. Note that this can be
accomplished with nonnegative perturbations as ∂∂αiG(α) =
k2α2i −2k2αi α¯+k1
(k1−k2α2i )2
> 0, which is positive since k1 > k2.
Since we choose the relative scaling of e1 and e2 based
on their contribution to the constraint function, we can find
the relative change in the objective due to the perturbations
by the expression
∂
∂αj
C(α)
∂
∂αj
G(α)
−
∂
∂αi
C(α)
∂
∂αi
G(α)
=
2k2αj
k2α2j − 2k2αjα¯+ k1
− 2k2αi
k2α2i − 2k2αiα¯+ k1
> 0
since 2k2αi
k2α2i −2k2αi α¯+k1
> 0 and
∂
∂αi
2k2αi
k2α2i − 2k2αiα¯+ k1
=
2k2(k1 − α2k2)
(k2α2i − 2k2αiα¯+ k1)2
> 0 ,
as k1 > k2 > 0. Therefore, the addition of e2 to αj increases
the objective more than the subtraction of e1 from αi decreases
it. Then, C(αˆ) > C(α∗), so α∗ is not an optimum, proving
the theorem.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Assume that α¯ < 1, so m < n. Let g(αi) = (αi − α¯)c(αi).
Then using (6),
0 = G(α∗) =
n
∑
i=1
g(α∗i ) =
m
∑
i=1
g(1) + g(α∗m+1) +
n
∑
i=m+2
g(0)
= mg(1) + g(α∗m+1) + (n−m− 1)g(0) .
We can solve for m, giving
m =
(k1 − k2)(nα¯(k1 − α∗m+1)k2 − α∗m+1(k1 − α∗m+1α¯k2))
(k1 − α∗2m+1)(k1 − α¯k2)
.
One can show that ∂m∂α∗m+1
< 0. Note that by definition,
α∗m+1 ∈ [0, 1) (as m represents the index of the first lane
such that αi 6= 1), so we can bound m using these values:
α¯n(k1 − k2)
k1 − α¯k2 − 1 < m ≤
α¯n(k1 − k2)
k1 − α¯k2 .
Therefore, m = b α¯n(k1−k2)k1−α¯k2 c. Note that in the case excluded
at the start of the proof, when α¯ = 1, this expression yields
m = n, which is correct. Therefore, this expression is true
for α¯ ∈ [0, 1].
C. Proof of Proposition 1
First note that given feasible routing vector α, if there
exists one element αi > α¯, then there must also exist element
αj < α¯. This follows from the fact that G(1Tn α¯) = 0 and
∂
∂αi
G(α) > 0, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1.
Now we can prove the proposition by recursion. The base
case is α = 1Tn α¯. For any other feasible routing, there are
at most n lane autonomy levels αi not equal to α¯. Pick any
pair of lanes i and j such that αi > α¯ > αj (which, when not
in the base case, are guaranteed to exist by the fact above).
Then, using the reverse of the mechanism in the proof of
Theorem 1, we keep the constraint satisfied while decreasing
αi and increasing αj, while monotonically decreasing the road
capacity. This continues until either αi = α¯, αj = α¯, or both.
Now we have a routing vector with lower road capacity than
the original, with at most n− 1 lane autonomy levels not
equal to α¯, proving the proposition.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
To prove the first statement, note that due to Proposition
2, the cost for any feasible routing for the upper bound
capacity function is equivalent to ncUB(α¯). For given network
parameters k1 and k2h, we find our price of negligence:
Λ ≤ max
α¯∈[0,1]
ncUB(α¯)
nc(α¯)
= max
α¯∈[0,1]
k1 − α¯2k2
k1 − α¯k2 .
This term is concave with respect to α¯ for α¯ ∈ [0, 1], with
maximum at α¯ = k1−
√
k21−k1k2
k2
. Plugging this in,
Λ ≤ 2
k1 −
√
k21 − k1k2
k2
= 2
L+ h−
√
(L+ h)(L+ h¯)
h− h¯
≤ 2. (11)
To observe (11), note that k1 − 2k2 ≤
√
(k1 − k2)k1.
For the second statement, first note that if α¯ = 1, the
price of no control would be 1. Since Γ ≥ 1, let us exclude
that case. Now, assuming α¯ < 1 we apply Theorem 1 and
Proposition 2:
Γ ≤ nc
UB(α¯)
∑mi=1 c(1) + c(α
∗
m+1) +∑
n
i=m+2 c(0)
≤ nc
UB(α¯)
c(α∗1) + (n− 1)c(0)
, (12)
where (12) follows from the fact that Γ ≥ 1 and c(1) >
c(α∗m+1) ≥ c(0) so the denominator is minimized when
m = 0 (meaning there are no purely autonomous lanes).
We can then solve G(α∗) = 0 to find an expression for α¯
as a function of α∗1 , yielding
Γ ≤ n(k1 − α
∗
1k2)
n(k1 − α∗1k2)− α∗1k2(1− α∗1)
We then consider bounding Γ−1, which we show to be convex.
∂2
∂α∗21
(1/Γ) =
2k2(k21 + 3k1k2(−1+ α∗1)α− k22α∗31 )
n(k1 − α∗21 k2)3
The inner term on the numerator is convex for α∗1 ∈ [0, 1],
with second derivative 6k2(k1− α∗1k2). Its minimum over that
interval occurs at α∗1 =
k1−
√
k21−k1k2
k2
, yielding ∂
2
∂α∗21
(1/Γ) >
0. Solving ∂∂α∗1
(1/Γ) = 0, we find that the minimum of this
outer equation also occurs at α∗1 =
k1−
√
k21−k1k2
k2
. Using this,
Γ ≤
4k1n2 − 2n(k1 +
√
k21 − k1k2)
4k1n(n− 1) + k2
=
2n(L+ h)
(2n− 1)(L+ h) +
√
(L+ h¯)(L+ h¯)
≤ 2n
2n− 1 .
As k2 approaches k1, the above inequality becomes tight.
